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CRYPTOCORPORATIONS: A PROPOSAL FOR LEGITIMIZING
DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONS
Timothy Nielsen*
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advancement of smart-contract-based technologies building upon
blockchain networks,1 a unique organizational structure has emerged. The
decentralized autonomous organization (“DAO”) is a computer-code-based
organization in which business governance is automated by virtue of automatically
executing, breach-resistant smart contracts operating on an immutable, decentralized
network.2
A couple of years ago, a DAO was created and implemented on top of the
Ethereum blockchain network.3 It was championed by a German blockchain venture
called Slock.it and was a collaboration of experts and members of the public (the
“Slock.it DAO”).4 The Slock.it DAO exceeded expectations and raised more than
$150 million worth of Ethereum and issued over 1 billion tokens.5 In June of 2016,
the Slock.it DAO was attacked, revealing the Slock.it DAO’s vulnerabilities and
resulting in Slock.it taking both remedial and preventative measures to improve the
viability and security of its DAO model.6 One of the results of the attack was a clear
demonstration that, without building checks and balances into a DAO, opportunistic
individuals could take control and potentially drain all of the DAO’s assets.
The blockchain community at large learned several lessons as a result of the
Slock.it DAO. Among the lessons articulated on the Slock.it blog was both that
“[g]overnance and voting mechanisms adapted to decentralized systems need to be
developed” and that DAOs need to “[l]aunch [g]radually” to be positioned for
success.7 A major concern articulated on the Slock.it blog was that “the tools to
submit and debate opinions to guide the development of decentralized software have
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For further explanation of blockchain networks, see infra Section IIA.
2
For further explanation of DAOs, see infra Section II.D; see also Jeremy M. Sklaroff,
Comment, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 279 (2017)
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of using smart contracts which are stored on a
blockchain).
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not been developed yet.”8 The author of the blog post concluded that “[c]entralized
forums such as reddit are certainly not appropriate tools for this purpose. . . ,”9
continuing to say that current tools being used to guide the governance of DAOs “do
not represent the token holders. . . .”10
As blockchain and smart-contract-based technologies improve, the emergence
of DAOs will likely accelerate. 11 A legal organizational framework which fosters
political, legislative, and social debate around the governance of DAOs and codifies
the current standard of governance for all legally registered DAOs is essential in
establishing a consistent roadmap. Once there is a set of standard, default rules by
which a DAO must play to organize under a state statutory scheme, there will be a
benchmark for expectations concerning investor protection, duty allocation,
disclosure, and liquidity. In addition, mandating compliance with applicable
securities regulations12 with regard to the solicitation, sale, and transfer of DAO
Tokens can provide for more gradual, controlled DAO launches which prioritize
investor, or token-holder protection. Although this may not lead to an infallible
system of regulating primary blockchain markets, investor protection is a necessary
consideration and must be given sufficient weight when balancing the issues this
Note discusses.
This Note evaluates how a DAO may fit within the current landscape of
business organizational law and contemplates the advantages and disadvantages of
classifying a DAO as a partnership, Limited Liability Company (an “LLC”), or
corporation. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the DAO does not fit perfectly
within any currently available organizational structure. To fill that gap, this Note
proposes the concept of the Cryptocorporation, which is a theoretical hybrid entity
structure that could balance the probable real-world functionality of a DAO with
investor protections and secondary market support.
Part II of this Note will broadly discuss the background of blockchain networks,
smart contracts, and tokens. It will also discuss the Slock.it DAO and some of the
key characteristics of a DAO in general. Part III begins by identifying some current
barriers to investor protection and proceeds to analyze how a DAO fits within the
current laws of partnership, corporations, and state LLC statutes. Part III concludes
with the argument that DAOs should be legally recognized. Part IV begins by
drawing parallels between the status quo and the historical circumstances which led
to the initial recognition of the LLC. Part IV goes on to articulate the idea of the
Cryptocorporation, including some of its key characteristics and attributes.
8
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Blockchain and Smart Contracts
Fundamentally, the term “blockchain” refers to a protocol which utilizes
decentralized ledger technology.13 It is analogous to an electronic ledger in which
every entry is time-stamped, electronically signed, and connected in sequence with
the next entry. Because a global network stores all entries, the ledger can be
universally accessed, but one key feature of a blockchain is that past entries cannot
be changed.14 A blockchain has been described as “a shared, immutable ledger that
facilitates the process of recording transactions and tracking assets in a business
network.”15 These assets can be purely digital, like Bitcoin16 and other digital tokens,
or they can be more tangible.17 Interests in objects ranging from gold to intellectual
property rights have all been recorded, tracked, and securely transferred with
blockchain technology.18
The capabilities of blockchain technology have led to the development of
enhanced protocols which allow for specific, irrevocable, automatically executing
contracts, referred to as “smart contracts.”19 Smart contracts are encoded into a
blockchain and automatically execute once specific, pre-programmed conditions are
met.20 All decisions are made ex ante, and a breach is rendered impossible because
the computer code which governs the transaction cannot be altered or canceled.21
13
MANAV GUPTA, BLOCKCHAIN FOR DUMMIES 3 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2d IBM
Limited ed. 2018).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Although Bitcoin is purely digital and lacks any express face-value, it is not quite the
same thing as a fiat currency which is issued by a government:

While cryptocurrencies exist in a solely digital arena, fiat is more tangible and
physical. Alongside this, cryptocurrencies have a limited supply, whereas fiat
money is unlimited with the government producing more coins and paper money
when necessary. While Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are created by
computers, fiat currencies are issued by the government. Interestingly, the value
of cryptocurrency is not determined by the markets or government regulations, as
it is with fiat currencies. One of the other reasons that Bitcoin is making waves
and capturing the attention of the world is the fact that it is not controlled by
anyone or by any government, whereas fiat currencies are.
Is Bitcoin a Fiat Currency? Why? or Why Not?, CRYPTALKER, https://cryptalker.com/isbitcoin-a-fiat-currency/ [https://perma.cc/5QEV-7ED5] (last visited July 10, 2019).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Sklaroff, supra note 2, at 279.
20
Id. at 276.
21
Id. at 279.
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Although this rigidity may make smart contracts a poor tool for some commercial
agreements, they can offer low-maintenance, low-cost solutions in other situations.22
Advances in smart contract processing have given rise to code which, when
deployed, can serve some of the roles of corporate governance. 23 Specifically, some
groups have used blockchain technology to pool together funds, make investment
decisions, vote on ideas, and manage their business relationships with one another.
B. Cryptographic Tokens
The term cryptographic token refers to a unique digital asset which is
constrained by rulesets that exist on the relevant blockchain network.24 Some tokens
are called “native tokens,” which are tokens generated on a root blockchain layer.25
A root blockchain layer is the primary network which allows all future networks to
exist. Bitcoin26 and Ether27 are examples of native tokens because they are tokens
which are generated on the Bitcoin and Ethereum blockchain layers respectively.
These are distinguishable from tokens issued on a “sidechain,” or application layer,
which overlays the native blockchain layer.28
Native tokens are often used as part of an incentive scheme which encourages
individuals who do not trust or even know one another to participate in a validation
process.29 This validation process is the backbone of all functionality on the
networks. When any two parties seek to transact with the tokens on a given network,
the transaction has to be validated and a new entry made in the ledger.30 This process
relies on the participation of other users on the network.31 The networks use
incentive schemes to ensure that this happens relatively seamlessly. Bitcoin, for
example, is part of a “crypto-economic incentive” by which a distributed network of
individuals promote the purpose of the Bitcoin blockchain by collaborating to
22

Id. at 291–303.
See generally Christoph Jentzsch, Decentralized Autonomous Organization to
Automate Governance (unpublished white paper), https://download.slock.it/public/DAO/
WhitePaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZGL-SJDD] (discussing the code which was
implemented during the Slock.it DAO and explaining how that code is designed to automate
functions of corporate governance).
24
What Is a Blockchain Token? Intro to Cryptographic Tokens, BLOCHCHAINHUB,
https://blockchainhub.net/tokens [https://perma.cc/X7R9-TYGS] (last visited July 10.
2019).
25
Id.
26
See generally BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/ [https://perma.cc/59LE-55Q2] (last
visited July 10, 2019) (explaining the open-source, public nature of Bitcoin).
27
See generally ETHERIUM, https://www.ethereum.org [https://perma.cc/58J8-B8Y9]
(last visited July 10, 2019) (explaining the open-sourced, globally available nature of
Etherium).
28
See BLOCHCHAINHUB, supra note 24.
29
See id.
30
See id.
31
See id.
23

2019]

CRYPTOCORPORATIONS

1109

validate transactions and create new blocks.32 These native tokens have taken on a
role analogous to currency; both Bitcoin and Ether are used to transact and store
value.33
In addition, some networks allow for additional networks to be created atop the
native layer. For example, the Ethereum blockchain allows for an additional
application layer to exist on top of the native blockchain layer.34 As a result, we have
seen the emergence of tokens referred to as “dApp tokens.”35 These are smartcontract-based tokens which are not necessarily used as part of an incentive scheme
and can be created and distributed more freely than tokens which must be bound by
the terms of an incentive scheme.36 Because of the level of flexibility within smart
contracting and the lack of a need to issue these tokens in a manner which preserves
a necessary incentive system, these tokens can more easily represent voting rights,
ownership rights, claims to real assets, and more.37 For the purposes of this Note,
the term “token” will refer to smart-contract-based tokens rather than native tokens.
C. The Concept of Pseudonymity
The term “pseudonymity” is used in context with many blockchain
transactions. It refers to a concept which is less private than true anonymity and
arises when individuals act under a pseudonym.38 Unlike true anonymity, it is
sometimes possible to ascertain the identity of someone acting with pseudonymity
by connecting multiple sources of information or evaluating data in varying
contexts.39 For example, if someone uses a pseudonym to transact or communicate
online, the identity of that individual could be ascertained, or at least some
identifying information could be determined if they request something to be shipped
to them or if they use their real name for a limited purpose. Small pieces of
potentially identifying information can be gathered from communications in online
forums and inferred based on the context and content of communications. In other
words, although many users of online services may wish to maintain their
pseudonymity, it is not true anonymity and it does not render an individual
impossible to identify.
32

See id.
I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, § 2, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938 (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-irbs/irb14-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6QC-WYUB].
34
See Beginners: What Is Etherium?, ETHERIUM, https://ethereum.org [https://perma.
cc/EW44-W6K3] (last visited July 15, 2019).
35
Cryptographic Tokens, BLOCKCHAINHUB, https://blockchainhub.net/tokens
[https://perma.cc/LL2U-EUJQ] (last visited July 15, 2019).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
See Juliya Ziskina, The Other Side of the Coin: The FEC’s Move to Approve
Cryptocurrency’s Use and Deny Its Viability, 10 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 305, 318 (2015).
39
Id. at 325 (discussing how some blockchain technology users choose to give up
pseudonymity by voluntarily associating personal information with a key address).
33
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Pseudonymity can be a double-edged sword. In part, it makes blockchain
transactions attractive because users are permitted to transact based on aliases or
with limited disclosure of personal identifying information. Pseudonymity can be
beneficial in encouraging or enticing interactions between strangers who may not
trust each other enough to provide their bank account details, social security number,
etc. However, a potential downside is that pseudonymity—in comparison with full
transparency or disclosure—could raise the risk of fraud, theft, or otherwise taking
advantage of another with a reduced chance of being caught.
D. Decentralized Autonomous Organizations
In general, the term “decentralized autonomous organization” (“DAO”) refers
to a distributed network of stakeholders who participate in an organizational
structure despite not trusting or even knowing one another.40 The stakeholders do
not have a formal organization or employment contracts but are instead governed by
smart contract provisions which exist within software code and a structure which
exists on the respective network.41 The Bitcoin Network has been referred to as the
“first true DAO.”42
The term “DAO” was also used in a white paper (“White Paper”) written by
Slock.it Founder and Chief Technology Officer, Christoph Jentzsch. The White
Paper outlines the first implementation of smart-contract-based DAO code on the
Ethereum network, which was designed to “automate organizational governance and
decision-making.”43 The novel purpose of Jentzsch’s White Paper was to share an
example of a method which allows for “participants [to] maintain direct real-time
control of contributed funds and . . . [for] governance rules [to be] formalized,
automated and enforced using software.”44
In this Note, the term “DAO” refers to a distributed organization whose
governance is largely automated and rooted in computer code. A DAO operates by
allowing pseudonymous token-holders to submit proposals on which the other
token-holders will vote in proportion to their total number of tokens.45 These
submitted proposals typically include investment ideas but could also theoretically
include malicious actions such as transferring all off the DAO’s assets to a single
individual.46
In an effort to prevent majority abuses, Jentzsch’s White Paper envisioned and
discussed an individual referred to as a “Curator.”47 According to Jentzsch, the
Curator position is ideally occupied by an individual with appropriate expertise and
40

Jentzsch, supra note 23, at 1.
BLOCKCHAINHUB, supra note 35.
42
Id.
43
Jentzsch, supra note 23, at 1.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
41
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is entrusted with the authority to approve proposals for voting (referred to as “whitelisting”) or reject proposals which could be malicious.48 The required number of
token-holder votes needed to approve a proposal varies depending on the type of
proposal. It could range from 20% to approve a white-listed proposal to as much as
53% in the model outlined in Jentzsch’s White Paper.49 Jentzsch envisioned that
token-holders would also have the ability to propose a replacement Curator if they
do not believe the current Curator is acting appropriately.50 It takes a majority of
token-holders to replace a Curator, and if the proposal fails, the minority group who
lost can split-off into their own new DAO which will be overseen by the Curator
whom they had proposed.51
Users can freely trade tokens issued by any DAO on applications (“apps”) in
often-volatile secondary marketplaces.52 Some tokens are acquired so that the holder
can exercise the underlying rights associated with a particular token, while other
tokens are bought purely for their potential to appreciate in value.53 The number of
token-holders could be very small or theoretically extend into the millions while
being fluid, with holders trading freely.54
III. ANALYSIS
A. Barriers to Investor Protection
As was discussed in Part II above, the nature of blockchain tokens is fairly fluid.
The rights and obligations associated with any particular token are highly
customizable, while the underlying computer code is strictly executed and complex.
One side effect of large-scale token issuances and the free trade of tokens in
secondary markets is the propensity for fraud and opportunism. An entity based on
the DAO model uses cryptographic tokens to convey ownership interest in the
underlying projects of the organization.55 In addition, the tokens grant voting rights
48

Id.
Id at 2.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Snovian.Space, Understanding Volatility in Blockchain Tokens, MEDIUM (Feb. 23,
2018),
https://medium.com/@ico_snovio/understanding-volatility-in-blockchain-tokens6be08f135423 [https://perma.cc/ZR7Z-2D7X] (explaining that “cryptocurrenc[ies] (as well
as blockchain tokens in general) are highly volatile assets.”).
53
See Yoav Vilner, Entering the World of Blockchain Investment: Coins, Tokens and
ETF, FORBES (Oct 1, 2018, 02:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/yoavvilner/2018/10/
01/entering-the-world-of-blockchain-investment-coins-tokens-and-etf/#5a3528a42713
[https://perma.cc/QTG7-RB85].
54
There are already several secondary exchanges which have been set up to facilitate
the trading and transacting in blockchain based tokens. See, e.g., COINEXCHANGE.IO,
https://www.coinexchange.io/ [https://perma.cc/X68P-8TK3] (last visited Aug. 16, 2019).
55
Jentzsch, supra note 23, at 2.
49
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to the token-holder, which are proportional to the number of total tokens issued and
secure a right to share in the profits of the organization.56
In 2017, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) published a
report analyzing the tokens issued during the Slock.it DAO (“the DAO Report”).57
In the DAO Report, the SEC concluded that the Slock.it DAO Tokens constitute
investment contracts, after applying a test referred to as the “Howey test,” which
was derived from a 1946 Supreme Court case, SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.58 The Howey
test provides a four-pronged analysis which has been used to define certain contracts,
agreements, or transactions as securities for the purposes of regulation.59 The prongs
include: (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, and (3) an
expectation of profits, (4) derived from the efforts of a third-party.60 The DAO
Report was a large step forward in terms of regulating a new and evolving space.
The DAO Report analyzed the specific characteristics of the tokens and applied
well-established legal principles to a new area of technology. The nature of the
Howey test, in general, and the analysis in the DAO Report relies upon a factual
inquiry. The SEC’s determination that Slock.it DAO Tokens constitute investment
contracts was fact-specific.61 The SEC evaluated the nature of the relationship
between token-holders and made decisions based on that unique situation.
Therefore, as helpful as a report like this may be, it does not establish a uniform
precedent.
The fact-specificity of the SEC’s analysis creates two main hurdles for
protecting blockchain token holders as investors. First, any time the SEC wishes to
exercise jurisdiction over an organization with potential attributes of a DAO, the
SEC will have to discover a lot of detailed information about the specific properties
of the tokens and the underlying software code so that it can properly apply the
factors from the Howey test. This will either have to be done via independent
investigation or litigation. Second, it is possible that, either through technological
evolution or through intentional subversion, tokens and smart contracts could be
engineered in a way which will allow them to evade a prong of the Howey test. This
current method of SEC regulation through litigation will lead to gaps in SEC
jurisdiction and be both costly and slow.62

56

Id.
See generally U. S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 81207, REPORT OF
INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934:
THE DAO (2017) [hereinafter DAO Report].
58
Id. at 11 (citing SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946)).
59
See generally SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (discussing what
contracts or transactions may constitute securities for the purposes of federal regulation).
60
Id. at 301.
61
DAO Report, supra note 57, at 11–15.
62
Jason Gottlieb, With States’ Crypto Regulation, Problems Multiply, LAW360 (May
24,
2018),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1046549/with-states-crypto-regulationproblems-multiply [https://perma.cc/VD8X-E489].
57
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In addition to the enforcement drawbacks mentioned above, some argue that
the SEC got its analysis wrong to begin with.63 These arguments only bolster the
proposition that future enforcement actions will likely be hotly litigated and have
high costs in both time and money. A more efficient regulatory solution could be
found if DAOs were recognized in a way which grants the SEC a more presumptive
level of jurisdiction over the tokens issued by a DAO. One of the best ways to
accomplish this would be to establish a system by which tokens issued by a DAO
constitute stock,64 because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that stocks are by
definition a security and will almost always fall under federal securities laws.65
It could be argued that the Slock.it DAO Tokens were somewhat analogous to
shares of corporate stock because the Slock.it DAO Tokens satisfy several of the
factors of the five-part “stock characterization” test articulated in United Housing
Found., Inc. v. Forman66 and Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth.67 The Slock.it DAO
Tokens satisfied some of the stock characterization factors because, as the SEC DAO
Report discussed, the Tokens entitled the holders to dividends derived from profits,
they were somewhat negotiable, and the tokens granted proportional voting rights.68
Additionally, the SEC analysis in the DAO Report states that the “voting rights of
DAO Token holders [were] akin to those of a corporate shareholder.”69 The glaring
problem with this analysis is that the application of the “stock characterization” test
requires that the potential security in question also be expressly referred to as
“stock,” which rules out this hook for SEC jurisdiction.70
Compounding the difficulty of classifying tokens issued by DAOs is the fact
that there is ultimately no state-recognized entity that can be said to have issued them
and thus no LLC, partnership, or corporation from which to begin an analysis. State
regulation of business entities can be a great starting point for such an analysis. State
laws dictate default rules relating to the formation and management of partnerships,
corporations, and LLCs. These default rules mandate if and when a corporation has
been created and can set minimum standards for the establishment, distribution, and
transfer of stock or other ownership units.71 In the case of an existing DAO, a
corporate entity or partnership may somehow have to be established ex post facto.
63

See Ori Oren, ICO’s, DAO’s, and the SEC: A Partnership Solution, 2018 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 617, 637–47 (2018) (discussing the ways in which the SEC seems to have
misunderstood the DAO in their analysis).
64
See generally, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985)
(discussing what the earmarks of “stock” are for the purposes of regulation).
65
Id. at 694.
66
See United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
67
See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
68
See DAO Report, supra note 57, at 5–6 (describing characteristics of the Slock.it
DAO Tokens).
69
Id. at 15.
70
Landreth Timber Co., 471 U.S. at 686.
71
See generally Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6
(2018) (providing a comprehensive statutory structure for limited liability corporations).
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The absence of an existing corporate entity has not always precluded civil
action; de facto partnerships have been found by courts in cases where two or more
people work as co-owners of a for-profit business.72 Additionally, under doctrines
of de facto corporation and defective incorporation, courts have sometimes held that
a legal corporation existed even in the absence of a true de jure corporation.73 The
ways in which these doctrines have been applied, however, may make them difficult
to impose on a DAO. De facto corporation doctrine requires not only the presence
of a statute under which the entity could have been legally incorporated but also a
good faith attempt to comply with that statute.74 The doctrine of corporation by
estoppel has been implicated in situations where entities have held themselves out
as corporations.75 Due to the lack of any statute under which a DAO could have
organized, as in the case of de facto corporations, and the fact that DAOs usually do
not expressly hold themselves out as corporations, neither of these doctrines serve
to help the SEC effect investor protections and regulate DAOs.
Some scholars propose exemptions to securities regulations for DAOs,
claiming that “[c]ompliance with the burdensome requirements of registration . . .
would destroy this new technology and method of conducting business.”76
Concluding that the best way to prevent this would be for “Congress [to] amend the
registration requirements to provide an exemption for DAOs.”77 This proposal may
enable a DAO to operate more freely but does little to protect initial and secondary
market investors because it simply exempts DAOs from registration and does not
impose any alternative form of mandated disclosure or regulation. In addition, SEC
exemption does not resolve the issues arising from a DAO lacking any sort of formal
legal organization or classification which is recognized in the United States.
B. Analysis of How a DAO Fits Within Current Business Structures
Scholars and practitioners alike have proposed several methods of categorizing
and regulating DAOs under current business laws and norms. This part analyzes
72

See Laila Metjahic, Note, Deconstructing the DAO: The Need for Legal Recognition
and the Application of Securities Laws to Decentralized Organizations, 39 CARDOZO L. REV.
1533, 1549–51 (2018); see also In re Keytronics, 744 N.W.2d 425, 437, 441–44 (Neb. 2008);
Wayne N. Bradley, An Empirical Study of Defective Incorporation, 39 EMORY L.J. 523, 527–
30 (1990).
73
See Bradley, supra note 72, at 526; see also Cantor v. Sunshine Greenery, Inc., 398
A.2d 571, 573–74 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
74
See Bradley, supra note 72, at 527.
75
Id. at 529–30.
76
Tiffany L. Minks, Comment, Ethereum and the SEC: Why Most Distributed
Autonomous Organizations Are Subject to the Registration Requirement of the Securities Act
of 1933 and a Proposal for New Regulation, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 405, 405 (2018)
(discussing some competing arguments and proposing an amendment to registration
requirements for DAOs).
77
Id.
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those proposals and concludes that attempting to fit a DAO into current business
structures is like trying to put a square peg in a round hole; it’s simply not the right
fit.78
1. The DAO as a Partnership or Joint Venture
Some scholars have argued that the DAO should be considered a general
partnership or alternatively a joint venture.79 The Uniform Partnership Act (“UPA”)
has a fairly loose definition of a partnership.80 “Generally, a court in a state whose
partnership laws are modeled under the UPA will find that a partnership exists where
persons place their money into a business and share in the profits and losses.”81 This
understanding of a DAO offers some advantages: partnership status avoids the
potential double taxation of some corporate structures82 and may easily help define
the way in which the voting decisions are made by clarifying who has what decisionmaking authority.
Whether a DAO could constitute a de facto partnership or another kind of joint
venture, however, does little to promote adoption of the DAO as a legitimate entity
and may ultimately harm investors. Although partnership interests can be
transferred, partnership interests are not designed to be readily tradable in a
secondary marketplace.83 From an investor protection standpoint, the imposition of
personal liability84 for the actions of any DAO based solely on the acquisition of a
token in a secondary market could be devastating to an individual investor.
Some scholars have claimed that exposure to individual liability can act as a
potential check on bad-actors within a DAO.85 One downfall with this theory is that
it may not work on individuals who perceive themselves to be judgment-proof. If a
DAO were to commit a tort and a large portion of the token-holders were extremely
78

This problem has been recognized by other scholars who have analyzed and applied
the current business legal framework to decentralized autonomous organizations. See, e.g.,
Carla L. Reyes, If Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 373, 389–402 (2019)
(discussing how partnership treatment of DAOs leads to negative results and discussing
barriers to incorporation or organization as an LLC).
79
See generally Metjahic, supra note 72 (discussing the background of the DAO and
applying general rules of construction of the general partnership to the structure of the DAO).
80
Id.; see also UNIF. P’SHIP. ACT (1997), § 102(11) (amended 2013).
81
Matjahic, supra note 72, at 1550.
82
Matthew J. O’Toole, Christopher N. Kelly & David M. Hahn, Delaware May Be the
Right Jurisdiction for ‘Smart’ Orgs, LAW 360 (Feb. 16, 2018, 12:41 PM EST),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1013208/delaware-may-be-the-right-jurisdiction-forsmart-orgs [https://perma.cc/C747-47HD].
83
Although some partnership interests may be transferred or sold, the fundamental idea
that general partners can always choose their other partners makes general partnership units
difficult to transfer or sell. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997), §§ 501–603 (amended 2013).
84
The imposition of personal liability on all general partners for the liabilities of a
general partnership is inherent in the principles of general partnership. See id. at § 306.
85
Oren, supra note 63, at 654–55.

1116

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

difficult to find or outside of the United States, American investors could become
the most sought-after targets for collection while many “partners” may escape the
consequences of their liability via their pseudonymity or geographic location.
The proposition of a “Decentralized Partnership” in which the smart contracts
and tokens constitute a partnership agreement is also a compelling proposition;86
however, this proposed new structure still imposes individual liability on tokenholders. Moreover, a “Decentralized Partnership is more difficult to participate in
because it requires investors to be informed and to continuously participate to avoid
unwanted liabilities or investments.”87 This level of liability could substantially
harm token-holders and may have little to no deterrent effect on bad-actors within
the DAO because of their perceived status of being judgment-proof. The fact that
partnership shares carry personal liability may impose negative consequences on
individual investors and inhibit secondary market trading for these reasons.
Despite arguments that a DAO can currently be considered a partnership,88 the
proposition that partnership may not be the best fit is bolstered by suggestions of a
new type of partnership structure.89 As explained above, a DAO does not fit well
within the current definition of partnership for purposes of secondary market trading,
nor does it allow for adequate investor protections. Therefore, as will be explained
in the sections that follow, some kind of formal incorporation or organization could
become a high priority for creators and token-holders of a DAO, particularly given
that a partnership structure is likely the most fitting model to apply in the absence of
any other, and can be applied after any damaging conduct occurs.90 A court may still
hold a DAO Token-holder personally liable for actions of the organization where
there is a lack of any formal incorporation or organization.
2. The DAO as a Traditional LLC
Some industry practitioners claim that a Delaware LLC may be an attractive
form of organization for DAOs going forward.91 Because of the specificity of this
argument and because of Delaware’s position as the “gold standard” of LLC law,92
this Note’s analysis focuses on the Delaware LLC code. Delaware offers an
exceptional amount of flexibility in the structure and governance of LLCs.93 Despite
86
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this flexibility, a few modifications to the DAO model would likely have to be made
so a DAO could successfully establish itself under the current laws of Delaware, as
explained below.
The LLC law of Delaware boils down to one primary rule; the LLC Agreement
will almost always control in any dispute.94 An LLC can articulate almost every
detail with respect to management, ownership structure, legal duties, and more in
the LLC Agreement.95 Provisions can be laid out, allowing for the free transfer of
ownership and voting rights.96 An LLC agreement can stipulate whether members
are or are not bound by fiduciary duties.97 LLCs also have the ability to choose a tax
structure which works best for its members, allowing them to avoid double
taxation.98
Another major advantage of the Delaware LLC structure over that of a
partnership is the limited liability.99 This makes purchasing interests on a secondary
market safer for investors and, applying this concept to DAOs, may encourage a
freer exchange of tokens on trading platforms. It may even be possible for an LLC
agreement to allow for membership interests in a DAO to function almost identically
to uncertificated shares of corporate stock.100
As appealing as the LLC structure may be, there are a few legal requirements
which may be facially incompatible with the DAO model. The first incompatibility
is Delaware’s requirement that an LLC maintain the names and addresses of each
member.101 Although the information may be kept primarily for internal use, any
manager has a right to access it.102 Hence, if this were applied to DAOs, token
exchanges could allow anyone who is interested in obtaining the list of names and
addresses of every member to do so within a reasonable amount of time. Because
there would be no barrier to becoming entitled to this information beyond the
purchase of a token in the secondary market, this identifying information could
94

See id. § 18–1101.
See id. §§ 18–1101, 18–1107, 18–702(b), 18–404.
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become public quickly and easily and lead to a breakdown in a key feature of
DAOs—pseudonymity. The pseudonymous nature of blockchain technology means
that with a few key pieces of identifying data, one could potentially ascertain the
real identity of a user on the Ethereum network.103 Members in a DAO may lose
their pseudonymity on an entire network by being required to provide identifying
information such as that required by Delaware’s laws. Because of this, potential
users may be hesitant to provide personal information in exchange for a stake in the
LLC. Further, as will be discussed more below, problems arising from the lack of
preservation of pseudonymity are not unique to LLCs.104
One of the largest deterrents preventing the LLC model from being widely
adopted as a form of registration for DAOs may rest in the exceptional amount of
flexibility Delaware grants to the terms dictated in the LLC agreement. This
flexibility is a double-edged sword. For example, Delaware does not mandate that
LLC Agreements be publicly recorded.105 On the one hand, this will result in
difficulties when researching a DAO as a potential investment and may cause
massive friction in secondary markets. Even if an LLC has the ability to organize
and set up in such a way that the governance in written bylaws or articles mirrors
the code or philosophy of a DAO, this ability does not mean that it actually will be
set up accordingly. In other words, the freedom to do a certain thing, or not to do it,
does little to establish certainty that the thing was done. On the other hand, the
information-risk created by potential ambiguity in an LLC agreement could be
mitigated if the LLC Agreement is freely distributed along with the tokens.
However, the need to conduct research prior to obtaining a token, to ensure what
rights and duties accompany it, is still less than ideal for investors.
It is also a drawback that the same flexibility which could theoretically allow a
DAO to function as an LLC could also allow others to take advantage of investors
through LLC agreements which do not grant the rights or protections which an LLC
member may have expected. The fiduciary duty is a specific example of an attribute
which a potential investor may presume to be present and protective of the investor’s
interests, but the presence and utility/helpfulness of such duties actually will depend
on the language of the LLC agreement.106 On the one hand, the presence of fiduciary
duties could be very helpful in ensuring that the Curator, programmers, and even
other members act appropriately concerning the financial interests of the other
members.107 On the other hand, these duties could also be imposed on membermanagers and impose unwanted duties on investors. Without any provision to the
contrary, it could be assumed that each member-manager has a duty to disclose any
potentially conflicting business operations.108 Given the restrictions imposed on
103
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managers, partners, and directors under the duties of loyalty and care,109 the presence
of fiduciary duties may also expose token-holders to a level of liability with which
they are not comfortable if they inadvertently, or unknowingly breach those defaultduties.
Delaware LLC law does allow for the elimination of fiduciary duties,110 but this
only adds another layer of informational uncertainty for secondary market investors.
Whether a Curator is bound to act in the best interest of token-holders or the
organization may be unknown to investors because that duty could have been
eliminated in the LLC agreement. The presence of duties and the extent to which
they may protect DAO participants and investors would be subject to the specific
provisions in the LLC agreement.111 Indeed, the presence of a fiduciary duty could
protect investors, and organizing a DAO as a Delaware LLC could give rise to such
duties;112 however, the drawback is the potential inconsistency among different
LLCs and the extent to which token-holders may be unable to rely on the presence
of such duties or may be forced to take on unwanted duties of their own as member
managers.
In sum, under the existing legal and technological framework, a Delaware LLC
may be the best fitting legal entity under which a DAO could organize under current
law.113 Despite this, it’s still not the right fit. As technology advances and as DAO
Tokens become more widely traded, a more consistent structure which grants
uniform rights to token-holders would better protect investors, reduce friction in
secondary markets, and help prevent investor abuse.
3. The DAO as a Traditional Corporation
Many of the advantages of organizing as a Delaware LLC could also be
accomplished if a DAO were to take the form of a Delaware corporation. The lack
of personal liability for corporate shareholders, as well as the presence of fiduciary
duties on the part of directors,114 may account for some of the reasons that
corporations make up a large portion of publicly traded entities.115
109

See Peter Molk, How do LLC Owners Contract Around Default Statutory
Protections, 42 IOWA J. CORP. L. 503 (2017) (discussion the fiduciary duties of managers
and the ways in which they protect stakeholders); see also Michael Haynes, Comment,
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Another reason that the secondary market for shares of corporate stock has been
able to thrive is the fact that a share of common stock issued by one public company
generally has the same rights attached to it as a share issued by a different public
company.116 Of course, there are exceptions and qualifications to that generalization;
but for the most part, an investor, a regulator, and a corporation all know what rights
and duties they have when dealing with a share of common stock. The way this
certainty and consistency facilitates the secondary market in corporate stock shares
is best illustrated by envisioning what would happen in the absence of such
consistency and certainty: if buying a share of Apple stock exposed each shareholder
to personal liability, but purchasing a share of Microsoft stock did not, there would
likely be more due diligence required before purchasing corporate stock in a
secondary market, and thus a lot more friction.
DAO Tokens constituting a record of uncertificated shares of corporate stock
could make up a safer and more efficient secondary market than one made of highly
customizable and broadly variable membership interests in DAOs classified as
LLCs. However, the privacy concern raised by the informational requirement of the
Delaware LLC code117 would also be an issue under Delaware corporate law. This
is because of Delaware’s requirement that a corporation maintains a stock ledger,
which could be made accessible and then distributed beyond internal use.118 For this
reason, even being a common stock shareholder in a DAO may require that investors
be willing to give up their pseudonymity, which is not a current requirement to
participate in a DAO.119
Another area in which the corporate structure stands in contrast with the DAO
model is the voting structure and the powers of a board of directors. In a corporation,
the shareholders vote for the election of directors and sometimes for specific
initiatives.120 The board of directors generally makes the majority of the day-to-day
management of corporate affairs and financial decisions, and the board’s actions are
constrained by duties and responsibilities which are owed to the shareholders and
the corporation.121 This is much more analogous to the United States’ form of a
representative republic than to that of the purer democracy inherent in a DAO.122
116

See Melissa Horton, What Rights Do All Common Shareholders Have?,
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Despite the more democratic nature of the DAO model, the architects of the
Slock.it DAO code ultimately realized the risks of a majoritarian attack on the
minority and established the Curator role so that a human could theoretically protect
minority owners from an attack by which a 51% owner proposes to transfer all of
the DAO’s assets to the 51% owner and then unilaterally votes it into action.123 The
Curator component of a DAO was originally theorized and has since been
implemented, to avoid attacks like these and to establish some level of oversight
when propositions are suggested.124 The Curator may be a single person, as was
articulated in the White Paper,125 or it could be expanded to include a group of
people. The token-holders have the ability to confer or remove this power from an
individual.126 The Curator, or a group of Curators, function in a way which requires
that they approve or “white-list” proposed initiatives or proposals before a vote can
be held.127 By doing this, the DAO model has placed some limitations on the pure
democracy of the operations. Further, although individual token-holders still
exercise more decision-making authority in the operations of the DAO than a typical
disinterested shareholder of corporate common stock, the shift from a pure
democracy makes a corporate structure fit the DAO model slightly better. The
Curator, or group of Curators, could constitute a board-of-directors-type role and the
token-holders could elect or remove them as appropriate. This would establish that
the parties making the white-list decisions act under a legally imposed fiduciary duty
and other responsibilities, such as furthering the interests of the token-holders, while
giving a possible remedy to those token-holders when these duties are breached,
beyond that of simply removing the Curator.
However, this analogy wherein token-holders are shareholders, and a Curator
constitutes a board of directors would present unnecessary complications. In a DAO,
the quorum requirement, or the number of token-holders required to approve a
proposal, is a variable function and may be set well below 51%.128 And although the
programming of the DAO has the ability to recognize certain types of proposals, like
a Curator removal vote, and to apply a higher quorum requirement to those
proposals, the required quorum for a perfectly functional DAO may fall below the
statutory requirements for shareholder initiatives to be unilaterally binding in a
corporation. Delaware law usually mandates that these types of shareholder votes
require a majority129 or even a supermajority, which is far from the 20% quorum
requirement articulated in the White Paper.130 To state it another way, if tokenholders were shareholders under Delaware corporate law, they could potentially lack
the legal authority to act in the manner prescribed in the DAO code.131
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C. Why the DAO Structure Should Be Legally Recognized
In light of the inadequacies of the existing business entity forms, the DAO
should be recognized as its own form of business organization. Creating a
specialized category of business organization under which a DAO could organize
would serve several favorable outcomes. First, it would allow for scaffolding, which
would support the growth and development of this emerging organizational
structure. Scholars have said that “[a]s [distributed ledger technology] and smart
contracts continue their rapid development, more distributed business organizations
will undoubtedly emerge.”132 There is an opportunity to create a channel through
which these organizations can legitimately form and operate. This would provide for
a much higher level of consistency than a scenario in which DAOs fail to follow any
formal registration process or one in which various DAOs register as a mix of LLCs,
Corporations, or Partnerships under the laws of one, or many states.
Additionally, as demonstrated in the prior sections of this Note, the DAO with
all of its current features does not fit squarely into any single legal structure. When
considering the future of decentralized organizational structures, scholars
acknowledge that their “success will depend on their ability to draw upon the unique
strengths of the [DAO] model while mitigating the significant governance and
enforcement risks posed by broad diffusion of power.”133 Creating a legal structure
which preserves the essential characteristics and supports the unique strengths of the
DAO model, while simplifying regulation and prioritizing investor protection, can
help ensure the success and further development of distributed business
organizations.
In the White Paper, Jentzsch acknowledges that “[u]ltimately, how a DAO
functions and its legal status will depend on many factors, including how DAO code
is used, where it is used, and who uses it.”134 It is of paramount importance to the
ultimate success of DAOs that states take action to encourage legal and productive
applications of DAO code. If efforts are focused on interrupting or halting DAO
operations, future use and innovations may reflect efforts to evade or subvert
regulatory enforcement. If, on the other hand, efforts are taken to encourage effective
and safe uses, the DAO can become legitimate, normalized, and develop within a
set of legal guideposts which balance the preservation of a DAO’s unique strengths
with risk mitigation.
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IV. PROPOSAL
A. The Emergence of the LLC as a Hybrid Entity
This Note proposes that a new hybrid entity be recognized, the
Cryptocorporation. This is needed because of the incompatibility and poor fit of
DAOs within current business organizational structures. Similar incompatibility and
poor fit have led to the creation of hybrid entities in the past.135 For example, the
LLC was considered a hybrid entity when it was first recognized by the state of
Wyoming more than forty years,136 and much has changed both technologically and
socially since then. At the time, the recognition of the LLC provided an alternative
to the Sub-Chapter S Corporation, for those who were looking to benefit from passthrough tax treatment while limiting personal liability.137 This new hybrid entity was
created because of the limitations which existed within the current structure.138 Laws
relating to Sub-Chapter S Corporations placed “severe limitations on the number of
shareholders” and restricted ownership to individual taxpayers within the United
States.139 Partnership law, on the other hand, imposed personal liability.140 As a
result, in 1977, the LLC was first recognized in Wyoming, and later, Delaware law
became the gold standard for the LLC nationally.141
B. The Cryptocorporation
This Note proposes and describes a new, theoretical hybrid entity, the
Cryptocorporation. The Cryptocorporation could be recognized by the passing of
legislation in any state which chooses to include such entities among its other forms
of legal organization. Although any state could choose to lead the way in adopting
something of this nature, Delaware and Wyoming are both strong candidates, given
their historical roles in business organizational law and their fairly recent legislative
discussion around adopting blockchain technology for specific purposes.142
Regardless of the state, the law should allow for DAO code implementation while
providing consistency for investor protection and secondary market concerns.
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C. Attributes of the Cryptocorporation
1. Legal Recognition, Service of Process, and Personal Jurisdiction
First, a Cryptocorporation must have legal existence within a state. Not only
does this serve to facilitate service of process, but it can also help grant jurisdiction
to relevant courts. For example, if a Cryptocorporation were to be organized in
Delaware, the Court of Chancery would have “jurisdiction to hear and determine all
matters and causes in equity,”143 and to “mediate . . . hear and determine technology
disputes. . . .”144 This sort of groundwork must be laid so that potential investors,
regulators, and other stakeholders understand not only which jurisdiction will have
authority to interpret the law, but also how to serve and file appropriate documents.
2. Pass-through Tax Treatment
Pass-through tax treatment145 will be an essential component of the
Cryptocorporation. Allowing for this will preserve the partnership-nature of the
profit-sharing and avoid double-taxation in the way that a Sub-Chapter S
Corporation does.146 Codifying this sort of tax treatment with regard to the tokenbased shares of a Cryptocorporation could also help provide guidance on future tax
regulation. At the moment, the IRS considers virtual currency to be property for tax
purposes.147 However, not all cryptographic tokens are created equal, and they
should not all be considered the same for federal tax purposes. Token-based shares
of a Cryptocorporation could be an easily distinguishable asset and allow the IRS to
begin to treat tokens with certain demonstrable attributes differently than others.
Tokens of a Cryptocorporation could all be presumed to function in substantively
the same way by default. They will, therefore, be much easier to regulate and define
under the Internal Revenue Code.
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3. Limited Liability
As discussed above in Part III, consistently limiting personal liability for tokenholders is essential to a low-friction secondary market. In addition, this feature will
prevent secondary-market-purchasers of tokens from taking on unknown or
unwanted legal liability, which is an important protection for investors and those
wishing to participate in a DAO. The most common rationale for imposing personal
liability—that liability serves as a check on potential bad actors—is ineffective in
the context of DAOs. The reason is that, as explained above in Section III.B.1, bad
actors in the DAO setting are often likely to be unreachable and thus would escape
liability while leaving U.S. citizens unduly burdened/targeted with liability in U.S.
courts.148
4. Exclusively Token-based Stock
The tokens issued by a Cryptocorporation will constitute shares of stock, and
all stock shall be issued in the form of tokens. This will allow for the sale or transfer
of shares to a single owner, a small group of owners, or to the general public. The
SEC will have presumptive jurisdiction since the tokens will be referred to as stock
and since the attributes of the tokens will satisfy many of the attributes articulated
in the “stock characterization” test.149 The tokens will represent a proportional right
to receive a dividend contingent upon profits; they will have characteristics of being
negotiable by being saleable; they will grant a right to vote in proportion to the total
number of shares outstanding; and, they will have the possibility of appreciating in
value.150 The maximum number of shares will be articulated in the filed articles and
can be changed by filing an amendment thereto. Also, the Cryptocorporation would
be responsible for filing all appropriate documents with the SEC,151 regarding the
sale or transfer of the tokens, as may depend on to whom they are solicited.
An advantage of this proposal is that, because the rights and duties associated
with one token of a Cryptocorporation will be predominantly the same as any other,
investors will not have to engage in prohibitively excessive research prior to
purchasing a token. Whether investors are purchasing tokens with the intent to
148
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exercise their voting rights and actively participate, or whether they are purchasing
the token as a way to hopefully make money from its appreciation over time, the
secondary-market should be safer and smoother.
5. Voting Rights, Quorum Requirements and Division
The fifth attribute of this Note’s proposed Cryptocorporation is the ability of a
specified number of token-based-shareholders to act in a binding manner in certain
circumstances. The Cryptocorporation should allow for a quorum of token-holders
to act unilaterally, to the extent articulated in the code of the DAO. This could result
in a quorum requirement of 20%152 of voting shares to pass a proposal that has
already been white-listed by a Curator. This direct token-holder control is a key
component of a DAO; if a majority or supermajority of token-based-shareholders
were required to pass any proposal, or if a board of directors was ultimately
responsible for the decision, the appeal and novelty of a DAO would be greatly
diminished. The election and removal of a Curator would require a 51% quorum, as
is contemplated in the White Paper.153
Additionally, using a hybridization of LLC law, it should also be permissible
for a Cryptocorporation to split into two distinct entities upon filing a plan of
division and updated articles for each entity (the dividing and the newly created).154
This could give protection to minority token-based-shareholders by allowing the
entity to split into two organizations if the minority disagrees with the majority’s
decision to retain an unwanted Curator.155 Ultimately, a vote like this would result
in the existence of two Cryptocorporations: the dividing entity, which would consist
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Twenty percent of token-holders is the quorum requirement to initially pass a
proposal as envisioned in the White Paper. Jentzsch, supra 23, at 2.
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of the majority who voted to retain the unwanted Curator, and a newly created entity
made up of the minority token-based-shareholders and the proposed replacement
Curator.
6. Maintaining Pseudonymity
The ability to maintain pseudonymity is also an important attribute for a
Cryptocorporation. Some scholars have opined that pseudonymity can lead to a lack
of communication156 or that it is enjoyed in large part by those wishing to do
something illegal.157 Both of these arguments are unpersuasive when considering
impeding or obstructing an emerging disruptive technology like the DAO and the
refinement of smart contract technologies. First, there may be any number of
“legitimate reasons for law-abiding persons to want to engage in private transactions
in certain contexts.”158 Second, the DAO implemented by Slock.it hosted online
forums where token-holders and members of the public could debate proposals.159
There is no indication that the pseudonymity of the token-holders curtailed
communication.160
Further, the necessary disclosures and communication that would need to be
distributed to token-based-shareholders can be accomplished electronically without
keeping a record of the names and addresses of every shareholder or member.161 The
Cryptocorporation should allow for a blockchain-based stock ledger of sorts that
does not require the recording of the holder’s name, address, or physically
identifying information. A ledger like this will still allow for communication of
important information to shareholders (such as statements of gains or losses or
required disclosures), and it will place no limits on the ability of shareholders and
members of the public to communicate electronically, but it will maintain the key
pseudonymity of Cryptocorporations. This type of record keeping is made viable by
blockchain technology162 since all transactions will already be securely and
permanently logged in real time. This obviates the need for a manually maintained
shareholder ledger or a periodically updated filing made to the state.
7. Responsibilities of the Curator
A Cryptocorporation should impose some level of fiduciary duty on the
Curator. The Curator should be legally required to act in the best interest of the
Cryptocorporation and the token-based-shareholders. This duty will act as an
important check on potential bad-actors and will add a barrier to those wishing to
act as a Curator with improper motivations. When determining which proposals to
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white-list and which ones to dispose of, the Curator cannot act simply out of selfinterest or in a way which would be harmful to the entity or its shareholders. To
facilitate informed decision making on the part of shareholders, Curators may be
required to list a country of residence and provide any other identifying information
which may be pertinent to securing sufficient votes to become elected. The Curator
may choose not to provide detailed information about themselves and may be
located outside the physical boundaries of the United States. To the extent that this
causes discomfort to shareholders, they will have the opportunity to propose and
vote for a more forthcoming or demonstrably qualified Curator, or to divide into a
new Cryptocorporation which elects such a Curator.163
8. Maintenance of Records on a Blockchain
The Cryptocorporation must be allowed to maintain a ledger of its token-basedshareholders, and record of all transfers and related information entirely on
blockchain technology. The tracking of the stock via tokens could eliminate the need
for intermediaries and facilitate a more efficient transfer of shares while preserving
accurate, immutable records. It could be required that the records and other
information be readily convertible to a readable, deliverable format within a
reasonable amount of time upon the authorized request of a token-basedshareholder.
9. SEC Compliance
The Cryptocorporation should be bound to adhere to SEC regulations involving
the issuance, solicitation, sale, and transfer of its token-based-stock.164 Some
Cryptocorporations may choose to be available to the public, while others may limit
their shares to accredited investors or a closed list of potential owners. This Note
does not conduct a thorough analysis of potentially implicated securities laws;
however, investor protection is of paramount importance, and federal regulations
should not exempt Cryptocorporations from compliance.
V. CONCLUSION
As blockchain technology develops further and grows in popularity and
scale,165 the issue of how to classify decentralized organizations will have to be
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addressed. A consistent well-suited solution will be instrumental in balancing the
positive contributions of the DAO with the risks. The first step to this end should be
to allow DAOs to organize within the jurisdiction of a state. How they organize
should not be so customizable and potentially unique so as to impose unreasonable
burdens, potential duties, and unknown liabilities on individuals purchasing tokens
in a secondary market.
A DAO does not fit well within the current landscape of recognized
organizational structures and, rather than shoehorning it into one, states should
recognize a new hybrid entity. This Note’s proposed Cryptocorporation form, with
rules and protections better suited to the unique qualities of a DAO, could allow for
the most appropriate tax treatment of shared profits, limit personal liability, and
allow for an appropriate voting structure as articulated in the White Paper. The
proposed Cryptocorporation would also protect investors and give the SEC more
presumptive jurisdiction over the token-based-stock that is issued and represented
exclusively through blockchain tokens. Cryptocorporations can actively attempt to
preserve the pseudonymity which exists on a relevant blockchain network, because
of the capabilities of electronic communication and the security of blockchain-based
recordkeeping. In sum, by borrowing from and building upon the attributes of
partnerships, LLCs, and corporations, the concept of the Cryptocorporation has the
potential to foster the productive use and development of smart contract technology
for decentralized organizations, while mitigating the risks to investors and
facilitating a more frictionless secondary market.

